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NOTE 
AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE V. PRISON FELLOWSHIP MINISTRIES: USING 
AGENCY LAW PRINCIPLES TO DEFINE THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF FAITH-BASED 
PROGRAMS, DETERMINE WHO CONTROLS PRISONS, 
AND ESCAPE FROM THE SHACKLES OF 
CONTEMPORARY ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Mark D. Tolles, II† 
ABSTRACT 
In 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled in the case of 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship 
Ministries, Inc., which involved an alleged Establishment Clause violation.1 
The court determined that the State of Iowa’s governmental financial 
assistance to InnerChange Freedom Initiatives, an organization affiliated 
with Prison Fellowship Ministries, violated the Establishment Clause 
because the funding was considered by the court to be an endorsement of 
religion. Additionally, the court held that InnerChange had been acting as a 
state actor. This Note will examine the Eighth Circuit’s decision and seek to 
determine whether it was premised upon sound Establishment Clause 
principles. Part II of this Note outlines a brief history of how the 
Establishment Clause has been interpreted since the founding of the United 
States. Part III reviews previous litigation brought against faith-based 
organizations under the Establishment Clause that is relevant to 
understanding Americans United. Part IV discusses several foundational 
principles of the laws of agency. Following a short explanation of key 
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 1. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 
Inc., 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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agency rules, Part IV acknowledges several examples where the courts have 
explicitly or implicitly framed their decisions in terms of agency principles. 
Then, it applies those same agency principles to the case at hand. Finally, 
Part V develops a proposed Establishment Clause test using agency 
principles and applies it to Americans United to show that the proposed test, 
while adding much-needed clarity to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
would not sacrifice any respect for religious liberty in America, nor would 
it permit the improper marriage of church and state that would lead into any 
sort of theocratic governing arrangement. Rather, the agency test would 
establish a clear bright line that would enable faith-based organizations and 
governments to cooperate without compromising the integrity of either set 
of institutions or coercing citizens to adhere to or support a belief system to 
which they do not personally hold.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, claims involving the First Amendment’s Establishment 
Clause2 have come under more stringent inspection by federal and state 
judiciaries as legislatures and executive officers attempt to change, 
redefine, or simply clarify the permissible points in society where religious 
activities and governmental affairs are allowed to intersect and coexist. 
While some governmental agencies and states have attempted to develop 
clearer and simpler guidelines that in practice create de facto segregation 
between all governmental endeavors and all things religious, others have 
sought to expand the permissible boundaries of church-state collaboration 
and interaction.3 The courts have been similarly divided in their rulings, as 
they struggle to determine the proper scope of the Establishment Clause. 
Courts disagree on how the Establishment Clause should be interpreted to 
address modern challenges and developments, especially in light of the 
increasingly expansive role that religious institutions and faith-based 
                                                                                                                           
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”). 
 3. For an example of the latter, see Exec. Order No. 13,279, 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (Dec. 
12, 2002), in which President George W. Bush stated that the purpose of this executive order 
was 
to guide Federal agencies in formulating and developing policies with 
implications for faith-based organizations and other community organizations, 
to ensure equal protection of the laws for faith-based and community 
organizations, to further the national effort to expand opportunities for, and 
strengthen the capacity of, faith-based and other community organizations so 
that they may better meet social needs in America’s communities . . . . 
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organizations play in providing essential social services to communities 
throughout the nation.4  
Due to the proliferation of faith-based activities in recent years, 
governmental funding of these sectarian organizations is one of many areas 
in which the courts have targeted potential issues relating to the 
Establishment Clause.5 Yet faith-based organizations are not novel entities. 
They have been in existence for decades, often escaping media attention as 
they work at the grassroots level throughout communities and religious 
congregations. However, as the federal government and many states have 
turned to them for help due to the lack of resources, personnel, and 
facilities, faith-based organizations have become popular actors, since they 
have been able to augment governments’ constrained roles in society.6 It 
was for these very reasons that the State of Iowa offered grant opportunities 
to community organizations and institutions, including Prison Fellowship 
Ministries, Inc., that could offer prisoner rehabilitation programs to 
supplement the overcrowded and burdened state-run prisons.7  
However, in Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. 
Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit held that the State of Iowa’s financial grants for the operational 
expenses of InnerChange Freedom Initiatives, which provided residential, 
value-based, prisoner rehabilitation programs, violated the Establishment 
Clause.8 The Eighth Circuit rationalized its conclusion by determining that 
InnerChange, which was managed by Prison Fellowship Ministries, had 
                                                                                                                           
 4. Compare Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 422 (holding that a faith-based program 
providing rehabilitation for prisoners violated the Establishment Clause), with Bowen v. 
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (holding that a federal grant program for faith-based 
organizations to provide teenage sexuality counseling was constitutional despite the 
Adolescent Family Life Act not exempting funds for religious purposes). 
 5. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE QUIET REVOLUTION: THE PRESIDENT’S FAITH-BASED AND 
COMMUNITY INITIATIVE: A SEVEN-YEAR PROGRESS REPORT (Feb. 2008). For example, since 
President George W. Bush announced his Prisoner ReEntry Initiative (PRI) in 2004 (funding 
beginning in 2006), over 30 PRI grants have been awarded to programs in 20 different 
states. Id. 
 6. Anna Stolley Persky, A Question of Faith: Cash-Strapped States Look Elsewhere 
for Inmate Rehab Programs, 94 A.B.A. J., June 2008, at 20, 20 (specifically discussing the 
governmental needs of Iowa and why it decided to allow nonprofit organizations to seek 
grants to provide alternative rehabilitation services to inmates). 
 7. Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 416-17. 
 8. Id. at 422. 
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functioned as a state actor through its employees’ abilities to “incarcerate, 
treat, and discipline inmates.”9  
Nevertheless, the court of appeals mistakenly affirmed the Southern 
District Court of Iowa’s decision that classified InnerChange as a state 
actor—that is to say, as an organization or individual acting on behalf of or 
in conjunction with the government, pursuant to actual governmental 
authority or colorable power, in order to carry out governmental 
responsibilities or functions.10 Essentially, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that 
Prison Fellowship Ministries had acted as a state actor through its 
InnerChange program because there was a connection, however nominal it 
may have been, between the state government’s authority and the 
InnerChange program’s actions.11 The court based this connection on the 
Prison Fellowship Ministries’ receipt of governmental grants that partially 
provided for InnerChange’s non-sectarian operating expenses.12  
Yet, there was no evidence presented that would substantiate the court’s 
state actor finding. A faith-based organization is not an agent of the 
government merely because it receives, or has received in the past, 
governmental financial support for non-religious expenses that are incurred 
as it provides community services. Indeed, a faith-based organization can 
be considered a state agent only when it acts in concert with the 
government to such a degree that the government has primary control over 
the organization’s activities. This requires a close relationship between the 
faith-based organization’s activities and the government, such that the 
government dictates most, if not all, of the organization’s activities through 
governmental control, oversight, and discretion. However, because the State 
of Iowa did not control InnerChange’s activities or methodology, and 
because InnerChange was not excessively entangled in the affairs of the 
state, the Eighth Circuit was incorrect to hold that Iowa’s support of 
InnerChange’s program constituted an Establishment Clause violation. 
This Note will begin in Part II by exploring the relevant historical 
background of the Establishment Clause and how early statesmen and 
Supreme Court justices interpreted its meaning. Part III will examine over 
one hundred years of case law pertaining to the permissible scope of 
governmental funding to faith-based organizations. Part IV will focus on 
the agency frameworks that have been implied in the case law concerning 
                                                                                                                           
 9. Id. at 423 (analyzing Prison Fellowship Ministries’ role as a state actor primarily 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its relevant case law). 
 10. Id. at 423. 
 11. See id. at 422-23. 
 12. Id. at 416-19. 
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faith-based organizations. It will also define the fundamental agency 
relationships and how they relate to Americans United. Part V will propose 
an agency framework test for Establishment Clause issues and apply the 
proposed agency test to other aspects of Establishment Clause litigation, in 
order to illustrate how an agency framework would affirm many of the 
Supreme Court’s past landmark decisions, while also providing a better 
bright-line test than those that are currently used inconsistently by the High 
Court and many lower courts. Part VI will then conclude.  
II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELEVANT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
While the words of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution clearly declare that the Federal “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion,”13 the specific meaning of 
those words is, at best, imprecise.14 At worst, the federal government’s 
evolving interpretation of the Establishment Clause injects instability, 
suppression, and fear into American communities and the manner in which 
citizens, churches, and organizations are able to practice and promote their 
religious beliefs.15 Even though the Founders “appoint[ed] chaplains, 
open[ed] legislative sessions with prayer, and declar[ed] days of fasting and 
thanksgiving,” Jon Meacham observes that “[i]n America a kind of ‘wall’ 
between church and state—albeit a low one—has always been there, or at 
least has been since the last state (Massachusetts) disestablished its church 
in 1833.”16 Yet, the degree of separation between the church’s authority and 
the state’s jurisdiction that existed at the founding of the United States is 
quite different from the strict separationist position advocated today in 
many Establishment Clause cases. 
The Declaration of Independence, which portrayed the type of 
government that the American colonists felt the American people were 
naturally entitled to as human beings, strongly affirmed that religion and 
                                                                                                                           
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14. See PAUL I. WEIZER, THE OPINIONS OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA: THE CAUSTIC 
CONSERVATIVE 23-25 (2004) (explaining how the Supreme Court has had periods of 
consistency as well as inconsistency in how it interprets the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment). 
 15. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, in THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION CLAUSE 136, 136-40 (Alan Brownstein ed., 
2008). 
 16. JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL: GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE 
MAKING OF A NATION 82 (2006). 
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religious beliefs were inseparable from the governance of nations, even 
when nations themselves were not theocracies. 
[T]he Founders were also making another declaration: that 
Americans respected the idea of God, understood the universe to 
be governed by moral and religious forces, and prayed for divine 
protection against the enemies of this world, but were not 
interested in establishing yet another earthly government with 
official ties to a state church.17 
This is seen in the actions taken by General Washington following the 
American victory at the Battle of Saratoga. Washington declared that “[t]he 
chaplains of the army are to prepare short discourses suited to the joyful 
occasion to deliver to their several corps.”18 By no means did Washington 
wish to establish a national church, though he did recognize the spiritual, 
moral, and social value of cooperation between a secular government and a 
religious citizenry.19 In fact, after the Anglican Church was disestablished 
as the state church of Virginia in 1779, Washington, joined by John 
Marshall (who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court), attempted 
to pass a proposal through the state legislature “to put all Christian churches 
on an equal footing by supporting all of them by taxation.”20  
John Adams had a similar view of how the government would be 
dependent upon the religious beliefs and values of the colonists. He stated 
that, “Our constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is 
wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”21 John Jay, the first 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, echoed this proposition. Jay stated: 
No human society has ever been able to maintain both order and 
freedom . . . apart from the moral precepts of the Christian 
                                                                                                                           
 17. Id. at 78. 
 18. Id. at 77 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 19. See id. at 77-78. 
 20. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 183 (1954). Although Washington 
and Marshall endorsed this proposal, other leaders, including Jefferson and Madison, 
vehemently opposed such financial support to churches. Id.; see also STEPHEN MANSFIELD, 
TEN TORTURED WORDS: HOW THE FOUNDING FATHERS TRIED TO PROTECT RELIGION IN 
AMERICA . . . AND WHAT’S HAPPENED SINCE app. 1, at 147 (2007) (“It would be strange 
indeed, if with such a people, our institutions did not presuppose Christianity, and did not 
often refer to it, and exhibit relations with it.” (quoting Letter from John Marshall to Jasper 
Adams (May 9, 1833))). 
 21. Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the 3rd Division of 
the Massachusetts Militia (Oct. 11, 1789), in 9 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF 
JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 228, 229 (1854).  
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Religion applied and accepted by all the classes. Should our 
Republic ever forget this fundamental precept of governance, . . . 
this great experiment will . . . be doomed.22 
John Adams and John Jay recognized that religion would necessarily 
permeate American society, and that religion would inevitably affect the 
federal and state governments and leaders.  
Sources from the writings and speeches of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison are often used to support the opposite ideal—that of a strict 
separation between church and state. Yet, a closer reading of their words 
reveals how they viewed that separation, which was largely in how the state 
and church possess authority over distinct jurisdictions. “The wall Jefferson 
referred to is designed to divide church from state, not religion from 
politics.”23 Jefferson embraced John Locke’s idea “that neither civil 
penalties nor ‘the right of the sword by the magistrate’ had any place in 
religious instruction. . . . Jefferson resolved to prevent the church in 
America from ever having any civil power and law of its own.”24 Although 
James Madison, the author of the First Amendment, stated that “[t]he 
Constitution of the U.S. forbids everything like an establishment of a 
national religion,”25 he also declared that “[r]eligion is the basis and 
Foundation of Government.”26 Madison conceived of a separation between 
the federal government and a nationally established church. However, 
Madison recognized that complete separation was not possible, necessary, 
or even desirable. In arguing that provisions for legislative chaplains would 
be unconstitutional under the strictest interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause, Madison noted that this de minimis violation of the First 
                                                                                                                           
 22. MANSFIELD, supra note 20, app. 1, at 145-46. 
 23. MEACHAM, supra note 16, at 19. It should be noted that Jefferson did not want the 
church, a spiritual entity, to have civil authority, nor did he want the government, a civil 
entity, to be able to coerce people concerning their spiritual affairs; however, Jefferson did 
proclaim days of thanksgiving and make other religious acknowledgements as governor of 
Virginia, even though he refused to do so as president. For many of the Founders, there was 
a distinction between a public, federal-imposed religion and the private aspects of religion 
that were prevalent in the states and their communities See generally id. at 22. 
 24. CHARLES B. SANFORD, THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 30 (1984). 
 25. MEACHAM, supra note 16, at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. MANSFIELD, supra note 20, app. 1, at 146. This further shows how the Founders 
viewed the Establishment Clause as a restriction only upon the federal government, not all 
levels of government. 
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Amendment was not worth contending against where such religious 
traditions had a substantial history.27  
The influential Supreme Court jurist Joseph Story proclaimed that 
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, . . . the general . . 
. sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive 
encouragement from the State, so far as such encouragement was 
not incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and the 
freedom of religious worship.28  
As the meaning of the Establishment Clause has morphed from James 
Madison’s simple prohibition restraining Congress from establishing a 
national religion into the complex, modern framework for evaluating any 
utterance of religion by any governmental entity,29 it is evident that the 
purpose and scope of application of the Establishment Clause has become 
significantly restrictive towards religion in general.30 Much has been done 
to perpetuate the building of a high and mythical “wall of separation,” 
which has created divergent jurisprudential interpretations of the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.31  
In most areas of constitutional law, the scope of issues becomes greatly 
narrowed over time as federal and state legislatures enact statutes to refine 
constitutional limitations as unique situations arise. The courts tend to slow 
constitutional litigation in particular areas as they resolve interpretive 
disputes that establish guidelines for future jurisprudence. However, 
                                                                                                                           
 27. MEACHAM, supra note 16, at 228. During the debate over the appointment of 
congressional chaplains, Madison noted that the provision of such chaplains violated a strict 
interpretation of the Constitution; yet, he exclaimed that “as the precedent is not likely to be 
rescinded, the best that can now be done may be to apply to the Constitution the maxim of 
the law, de minimis non curat [lex],” which means that “the law does not concern itself with 
trifles.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). At any rate, Madison recognized that the wall 
of separation between church and state was lower in some areas than in others. Id. 
 28. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 316 (Regnery Gateway 1986) (1859), as quoted in GARY DEMAR, AMERICA’S 
CHRISTIAN HISTORY: THE UNTOLD STORY 82 (2d ed. 1995). This shows that the 
Establishment Clause was intended to protect people and states from being deprived of their 
religious beliefs and orders by the federal government. 
 29. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 30. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (holding that 
a school district’s “policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games 
violates the Establishment Clause” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court 
has stated that the First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
 31. See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION 
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 55-70 (2002). 
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judicial review of Establishment Clause claims has multiplied in recent 
years due to the limited capacity of governments to attain their 
governmental interests and services, as well as due to emerging issues 
related to the expanding role of the religious community beyond the walls 
of its churches. As faith-based programs have become more prevalent and 
accessible, the federal government and many states have turned to them not 
only to meet important social needs, but also to also fulfill traditional 
governmental or pseudo-governmental functions.32 In recent years, faith-
based organizations have expanded their services to include programs for 
prisoner rehabilitation, substance abuse and addictions, character education, 
career development, health care, and sustenance. 
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court recognized that to those “who 
wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the ‘establishment’ of a 
religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of 
the sovereign in religious activity.”33 While such a statement is facially true, 
it masks the reality of what American colonists and early jurists and 
statesmen truly feared: a nationally established system of religion that 
utilized governmental compulsion to gain adherents and to destroy 
previously recognized state religions or denominations.34 
III.  THE ORIGINS OF LITIGATION AGAINST FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 
Despite the recent surge in litigation involving faith-based activities, 
faith-based organizations are not new to the United States or its prison 
systems. In fact, records indicate that as early as 1787, religious 
organizations were influential in developing alternatives to the crowded 
prison systems that were then in existence.35 
                                                                                                                           
 32. See Persky, supra note 6, at 20. 
 33. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
 34. See REPORTS OF COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MADE DURING 
THE FIRST SESSION OF THE THIRTY-THIRD CONGRESS 1, 6, 8-9 (1854), and THE REPORTS OF 
COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SECOND SESSION OF THE 
THIRTY-SECOND CONGRESS, 1852-53, 1-4 (1853) (showing that the American public and 
leaders, even through the Civil War era, believed that an “establishment of religion” meant 
that the government was declaring a particular religion to be the only religion in its territory 
and that all citizens would be compelled to participate in that established religion), reprinted 
in DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION 30-31 
(2000). 
 35. Free Library of Philadelphia, Birch’s Views of Philadelphia in 1800, 
http://www.ushistory.org/birch/plates/plate24.htm. In 1787, the Philadelphia Society for 
Alleviating the Miseries of Public Prisons, which spear-headed many reforms in the prison 
systems during the United States’ early development, was organized. The Society was 
heavily influenced by religious beliefs. Those who developed the “penitentiary” at Walnut 
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The influence of religion as a treatment alternative in the 
correctional setting is as old as the history of prisons. The early 
Christian church, beginning in the days of Constantine, granted 
asylum to criminals who would otherwise have been mutilated or 
killed. . . . [I]mprisonment under church jurisdiction became a 
substitute . . . .36 
In the United States, religious entities took a similar role in providing 
useful social services, even in the prison context, from the beginning of the 
founding of the republic. From the Washington administration through the 
Madison administration, the federal government actively supported the 
missions and activities of churches in several social realms, including the 
evangelization of Native Americans. 
Federal executive policy toward Native Americans provoked 
remarkably little religious political friction. . . . With Elias 
Boudinot and Jedidiah Morse standing beside Jefferson and 
Madison, the church participated eagerly, with no complaint 
from the state, in what today would be called “faith-based 
initiatives,” administered by the churches and funded by the 
Indian Affairs office, which was lodged in the War 
Department.37 
Under President James Monroe, the executive office expanded its support 
for religious entities. “Until Monroe’s Civilization Fund was established in 
1819, upping the government ante, religious bodies received modest federal 
aid to help underwrite missions created to ‘civilize’ (Jefferson’s hope) and 
‘Christianize’ (Morse’s and Boudinot’s aim) the natives.”38 Congress had 
apportioned $10,000 for the Civilization Fund.39 These types of efforts to 
support religious entities in order to foster the religious development of the 
country continued throughout the nineteenth century. 
Prior to the Civil War, many charitable organizations established schools 
for juvenile delinquents and orphanages that were based upon non-
                                                                                                                           
Street Jail in Philadelphia thought of it as a means of providing prisoners with the necessary 
confinement needed to encourage prisoners to repent of their wrongdoings and seek spiritual 
guidance and growth. Id. 
 36. Harry R. Dammer, The Reasons for Religious Involvement in the Correctional 
Environment, in RELIGION, THE COMMUNITY, AND THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL 
OFFENDERS 35, 35 (Thomas P. O’Connor & Nathaniel J. Pallone eds., 2002). 
 37. FORREST CHURCH, SO HELP ME GOD: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE FIRST GREAT 
BATTLE OVER CHURCH AND STATE 395-96 (2007). 
 38. Id. at 396. 
 39. Id. 
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denominational Protestantism and Catholicism; some of these 
establishments were partially funded by grants from state and local 
governments.40 “The key fact about the full range of charitable institutions 
in this period, though, is that almost none were state-run, but nearly all . . . 
received significant government assistance.”41 Governmental assistance for 
these undertakings, which were spearheaded by faith-based organizations, 
was prevalent because prior to “the rise of the welfare state, government 
dealt with the problems of poverty largely by relying on private institutions 
and supplementing their financial needs when it became obvious that it was 
in the public interest to do so.”42 By no means was this governmental 
financial assistance trivial. For example, between 1869 and 1871 the New 
York City government contributed $1.55 million to faith-based institutions 
that were operated by Catholic and Protestant churches as well as Jewish 
synagogues.43 Several more decades would pass before the activities of 
faith-based organizations would be scrutinized as potential violations of the 
Establishment Clause. 
In 1899, the United States Supreme Court heard the case of Bradfield v. 
Roberts, which concerned the constitutionality of the District of Columbia, 
pursuant to congressional authorization, providing Providence Hospital 
with governmental funds despite the sectarian nature of the hospital and its 
monastic employees.44 The Court held that the appropriation to the hospital, 
which funded the hospital’s treatment services to the community, was not in 
violation of the Establishment Clause.45 The Court stated that its holding 
would remain true even if the hospital’s employees were members of a 
monastic order, if the hospital was operated under the auspices of the 
Roman Catholic Church, or if the hospital’s property had been titled to the 
Church.46 Thus, the Court reasoned that the public service of medical care 
and treatment was more important than the religious benefit that would be 
gained by the hospital employees who adhered to a particular religious 
belief system.47 This was the only Establishment Clause case that was heard 
by the Supreme Court until the late 1940s. 
                                                                                                                           
 40. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 92-93 (2005). 
 41. Id. at 94 (explaining how religious organizations had the flexible capacity to provide 
these pseudo-governmental activities as the needs arose in urban areas of the United States). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 94-95. 
 44. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 295 (1899). 
 45. Id. at 299. 
 46. Id. at 296-99. 
 47. Id. at 298-99. 
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In 1947, the landmark case of Everson v. Board of Education was 
decided by the Supreme Court.48 In Everson, the Court determined that it 
was permissible for the State of New Jersey to provide financial support to 
transport children to private, often religious, schools.49 While the Court 
stated that New Jersey would not be able to contribute money directly to the 
private schools to support their religious mission or religious curriculum, it 
noted that the state was able to provide a “general program” that enabled 
parents to ensure that their children would be transported to the private 
schools, since the education of youth is an important state interest.50 Thus, 
the Court recognized that religious institutions could receive incidental 
benefits when a state provides for important societal activities and achieves 
the purpose of such activities by employing religious institutions that are 
able to serve the state’s communities in such a manner.51 
In Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court went beyond Everson to recognize 
that religious institutions could even receive economic or financial benefits 
without violating the Establishment Clause.52 The Walz Court held that it 
was constitutional for states and municipalities to grant tax exemptions to 
churches because such exemptions, though they provide an economic 
benefit to the church and require governmental involvement in religious 
affairs, were not an excessive entanglement with, or sponsorship of, 
religion.53 Chief Justice Burger pointed out that “[t]he First Amendment . . . 
does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of 
Church and State.”54 
Largely building upon its precedent in Everson and Walz, the Court 
adopted a three-prong test in Lemon v. Kurtzman to determine whether 
statutes and legislative determinations violate the Establishment Clause.55 
The Lemon test, which continues to be utilized (although not consistently) 
as well as criticized by members of the Court, requires a statute to: (1) have 
a secular legislative purpose; (2) neither advance nor inhibit religion as its 
                                                                                                                           
 48. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 49. Id. at 18. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 6-7. 
 52. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970). 
 53. Id. at 674-75. 
 54. Id. at 669 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)) (holding that 
released-time religious programs are constitutional as long as they do not violate certain 
criteria). 
 55. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
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principal or primary effect; and (3) not excessively entangle government 
with religion.56  
Since deciding Lemon, the Supreme Court has reviewed only one case 
that has been primarily concerned with the funding of faith-based 
organizations by governmental entities.57 In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court 
upheld the federal Adolescent Family Life Act, which provided financial 
grant assistance to faith-based and community organizations that offered 
counseling to teens on sexuality issues.58 Though the Act had been 
challenged because it implicitly allowed funds to be used for religious 
purposes, the Court stated that it was immaterial whether the funds were 
utilized for religious purposes, since the faith-based organizations were 
achieving important governmental interests.59 Because an important 
governmental interest was properly being served, the religious character of 
the service provider was irrelevant.  
These Supreme Court cases have largely shaped Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, and they will be insightful as this Note examines the 
Americans United case and analyzes the agency relationships between 
states and non-state actors that the Court has explicitly and implicitly 
recognized throughout its jurisprudence. 
IV.  CONSIDERATIONS FOR FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS  
USING PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY LAW 
The First Amendment applies only to federal, state, and municipal 
governments as well as their subordinate governmental agencies and 
departments.60 Consequently, private persons and organizations cannot 
violate the Establishment Clause, because it is inapplicable to their private 
affairs. The essence of the Establishment Clause is to prohibit a government 
from instituting a state-sponsored religion, which either expressly or by 
effect gives tremendous preference to a particular religion or religious 
denomination to the exclusion of all other religions or denominations.61 
Absent a coup d’état, a private organization is incapable of establishing a 
                                                                                                                           
 56. Id. at 612-13 (emphasis added). 
 57. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
 58. Id. at 593. 
 59. Id. at 602-05 (analyzing the case under the three prongs of the Lemon test). 
 60. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 
Inc., 509 F.3d 406, 422 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating that “the under-color-of-state-law element of 
§ 1983 excludes from its reach ‘merely private conduct, no matter how wrongful’” (citing 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 
40, 50 (1999))). 
 61. See generally STEVEN G. GEY, RELIGION AND THE STATE 1-49 (2001). 
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state religion within a particular jurisdiction, despite its ability to promote a 
particular religion or engage citizens in certain religious activities. 
Yet, it is common knowledge that allegations have been brought against 
private organizations in the past for suspected violations of the 
Establishment Clause. Furthermore, many courts have declared that private 
organizations have acted in ways that contravene the Establishment Clause 
and its purpose.62 Many of the decisions finding Establishment Clause 
violations by private organizations are explainable because the 
circumstances that transpired fall into one of the following categories: (1) 
the government acted under the pretext of providing resources or funding to 
an organization in order to intentionally further specific religious activities, 
which the government could not do itself; or (2) the government (not under 
a pretext) provided resources or financial support to an organization, which 
utilized the governmental support to conduct activities that are purely 
religious in nature (regardless of whether the government knew that the 
support would be used for such activities).63 Aside from these examples of 
where governments or organizations have improvidently acted to further a 
particular religion or use public funds for clearly religious activities, a 
private entity can violate the Establishment Clause only if there is an 
agency relationship between the organization and the government. 
Consequently, an agency relationship will only exist where the private 
organization is working on behalf of the government to such a degree that it 
essentially becomes a governmental actor. Where this situation arises, both 
the government, acting indirectly as the principal of the organization, and 
the private organization, acting directly as the agent of the government that 
unlawfully acted, should be considered to have violated the Establishment 
Clause. 
For Americans United, this means that there must be an agency 
relationship between InnerChange and the State of Iowa, such that Iowa 
would have been prohibited from doing what InnerChange did and 
InnerChange would have been prohibited from accepting public funding for 
its operational expenses.64 Although courts do not explicitly analyze 
                                                                                                                           
 62. See, e.g., Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 424-25 (stating that the State of Iowa had aided 
in InnerChange’s religious indoctrination in ways that far exceeded the permissible scope of 
governmental involvement or accommodation of religion that the Establishment Clause 
allows). 
 63. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 209-11 (1948) (striking down a 
program that utilized public funding to conduct release-time religious educational programs 
on a school campus with school personnel teaching much of the content). 
 64. Ams. United, 509 F.3d at 416-17 (reimbursement funds from Iowa were being billed 
and used only for non-religious operating expenses, not for religious expenses).  
2010] AMERICANS UNITED 391 
 
 
Establishment Clause violations today in terms of agency relationships, 
court decisions dating back to the 1800s have recognized that agency 
relationships may exist between faith-based organizations and 
governments.65 In those cases, a closer examination of the courts’ rationales 
reveals that where an Establishment Clause violation was found, there was 
an agency relationship between the government and the religious 
organization, whereas no agency relationship existed when the courts 
decided that there was no Establishment Clause violation. 
For these reasons, a brief discussion of basic agency law principles will 
be helpful in re-examining the constitutionality of Iowa’s and 
InnerChange’s actions in Americans United.   
A. Understanding the Fundamental Laws of Agency 
At the most basic level, an agency relationship is “the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a “principal”) manifests assent to 
another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf 
and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents . . . to act [in such a manner].”66 There are two specific 
types of agency relationships that are applicable to faith-based 
organizations that act on behalf of governments: the master-servant 
relationship and the independent contractor relationship. Depending upon 
which relationship exists, the level of agency will be different and its 
consequences will change accordingly. 
 1. Master-Servant Relationship 
In the master-servant context, a master (principal) employs a servant 
(agent) to perform services on his behalf.67 The modern employer-employee 
relationship is an example of the master-servant relationship. In this 
relationship, the master retains a right to control the servant’s physical 
conduct,68 and the servant is authorized to do only “what it is reasonable for 
                                                                                                                           
 65. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 293 (1899) (stating that the appropriation of 
funds to religious societies would result in a “legal agency . . . which would, if once 
established, speedily obliterate the essential distinction between civil and religious 
functions”). 
 66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958) (Cum. Supp. 2008). 
 67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(1)-(2) (1958). 
 68. Id. 
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him to infer that the [master] desires him to do.”69 Thus, the servant’s 
authority can be utilized only to “act for the benefit of the [master]” at all 
times during his employment.70  
Since the servant’s authority is derived from the master and in 
furtherance of a benefit for the master, the master may assume liability to 
third parties who are injured or harmed by the servant’s acts.71 However, 
the master will not automatically be held liable for each and every act that 
the servant commits.72 Rather, the master will be held liable only when the 
servant does something that results in harm or injury and that the servant 
had either actual authority73 or apparent authority74 from the master to do.75 
In the context of faith-based organizations, the government could be held 
liable for an organization’s acts if the government had given the 
organization authority to act, even when the organization may have acted 
with an improper motive or made misrepresentations to third parties.76  
                                                                                                                           
 69. Id. § 33 (1958); see also id. § 35 (stating that the “authority to conduct a transaction 
includes authority to do acts which are incidental to it, usually accompany it, or are 
reasonably necessary to accomplish it”). 
 70. Id. §§ 39, 387 (1958). 
 71. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY (1839). Justice Story refers 
to such servants as “public agents,” and he states: 
[A]n agent, contracting in behalf of the government, or of the public, is not 
personally bound by such a contract, even though he would be by the terms of 
the contract, if it were an agency of a private nature. . . . [T]he natural 
presumption in such cases is, that the contract was made upon the credit and 
responsibility of the government itself . . . . 
Id. at 392-93. 
 72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (describing when a master 
will or will not be held liable for torts committed by its servant). 
 73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006) (defining actual authority as when 
“the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the 
agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act”). 
 74. Id. § 2.03 (defining apparent authority as “the power held by an agent . . . to affect a 
principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor 
has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s 
manifestations”). 
 75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958) (which primarily means that a 
master will be held liable for servant’s acts if they are performed within the scope of the 
servant’s employment); id. § 228 (discussing what acts might fall within the scope of 
employment); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006) (same); see also id. § 7.03 
(describing the principal’s liability to third parties as well as what elements related to 
authority and conduct are necessary to establish such liability). 
 76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161A(a)(ii), (iv) (1958) (explaining how a 
principal can be held liable to third person when a special relationship exists between them); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05(2) (2006) (same). In the prison context, if there is 
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 2. Independent Contractor Relationship 
On the other hand, an independent contractor is one (potential agent) 
who contracts to do something for another person (potential principal).77 An 
independent contractor may or may not be an agent of the one for whom he 
is working. The distinction between an agent-type and a non-agent 
independent contractor is that in the former relationship, an agent is “one 
who has agreed to act on behalf of another, the principal, but not subject to 
the principal’s control over how the result [the terms of the contract] is 
accomplished,” while in the latter non-agency relationship, the independent 
contractor “operates independently and simply enters into arm’s length 
transactions with others.”78 Thus, the difference depends on how involved 
the “principal” is in the day-to-day work and operations of the independent 
contractor. Where such involvement by the principal permeates the 
independent contractor’s daily business, and the principal appears to control 
or heavily influence all or most of the contractor’s decisions, a strong 
agency relationship will likely be found by the courts.   
 3. Distinguishing Between Servants and Independent Contractors 
Often it may not be readily apparent from contractual language or the 
factual circumstances whether a faith-based organization is acting as a 
servant of the government or as a non-agent independent contractor. 
However, the Restatement (Second) of Agency lists many factors that are 
helpful in determining what relationship exists.79 These factors include: (1) 
the extent of control that the master exercises over the details of the work 
performed by the other; (2) whether the one employed is in a distinct 
occupation or business; (3) whether in that kind of occupation it is 
customary in that locality to perform the work under direct supervision; (4) 
the level of skill required for the employed person’s occupation; (5) 
whether the employed person supplies the instruments and tools or the 
location for the work to be performed; (6) the duration of the employment; 
(7) the method of payment (i.e., by time, work job, or project); (8) whether 
the work being performed is part of the regular business that the employer 
                                                                                                                           
a master-servant relationship between the government and a faith-based organization, 
presumably the government would be held to a duty to protect the prisoners from acts 
committed by the faith-based organization. 
 77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958). 
 78. WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER & STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 47 
(6th ed. 2006).  
 79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) (listing ten factors that may 
illustrate whether a master-servant or independent contractor relationship exists). 
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conducts; (9) how the parties interpret their relationship;80 and (10) whether 
the principal is in business. Although no single factor is determinative, 
these factors can be analyzed in order to see which relationship is more 
indicative of the situation presented.  
B. Agency Relationships Recognized by Courts 
Although courts have not explicitly employed frameworks for 
determining violations of the Establishment Clause based upon whether 
master-servant or independent contractor relationships exist, many courts 
have discussed, in general terms, the presence of agency relationships in 
order to enhance or justify their holdings that there were or were not 
Establishment Clause violations. Several of the cases previously mentioned 
due to their significant impact on Establishment Clause jurisprudence have 
used agency terminology in order to explain the involved relationships and 
assess liability. 
In Bradfield v. Roberts, the Court viewed a religiously-affiliated hospital 
as a non-state actor.81 The Court stated that the religious nature of the 
hospital and its employees, and the fact that it was operated by the Roman 
Catholic Church and that its property was held by the Church, did not 
influence the government’s ability to provide funds for the hospital or 
create an Establishment Clause violation.82 Thus, under the master-servant 
and independent contractor distinction described above, the hospital in 
Bradfield would have fallen into the independent contractor category. This 
hospital, though religiously-affiliated, was open to all members of society 
who sought care at its facility.83 
In Everson, the Court held that governmental funding for the 
transportation of parochial students to and from parochial schools did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.84 Here, again, the Court found that the 
service being provided was a legitimate secular service that benefitted all of 
                                                                                                                           
 80. This refers to any written agreements between the parties. However, just because an 
agreement asserts that one of the relationships exists does not mean that the other 
relationship might not be more appropriate for classifying the relationship between the 
parties. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02 (2006). 
 81. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297-99 (1899).  
 82. Id. at 298-99. 
 83. Cf. Collins v. Kephart, 117 A. 432, 440 (R.I. 1922) (holding that a Jewish hospital 
that limited its services to only Jewish members of society was unable to receive 
governmental funds). Thus, it may be said that if the hospital received funds, it would have 
been using them only to further its doctrinal mission rather than to provide larger social 
needs. See id. 
 84. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947). 
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society, even though the transportation was being provided to further other 
sectarian affairs. But the transportation, in itself, was not a sectarian 
activity.85 Rather the government was ensuring that students would be 
provided with the necessary means to further their educational needs and 
goals: a non-sectarian purpose.   
In Lemon, the Court created its three-prong test and held that 
governmental funding of teaching salaries in a parochial school for secular 
subjects was unconstitutional.86 Here, there would have been a close 
master-servant relationship, as the government would have been funding 
teachers directly.87 
In Bowen, the Court determined that the Adolescent Family Life Act, 
which provided grants for religious and nonreligious organizations to offer 
teen sexuality counseling, was not facially unconstitutional.88 Here, the 
religious providers could be considered as non-agent independent 
contractors because they were provided funds only to serve a particular 
social need. However, the methodology used to fulfill that need was not 
prescribed by the government.89 Thus, the government did not dictate how 
the religious organization was supposed to act, nor did the government’s 
Act have the effect of promoting religion, because the religious and 
nonreligious organizations could act in a variety of ways that neither 
furthered nor inhibited religion.90  
Several scholars have listed the parameters of permissible governmental 
financial assistance in ways that allude to principles of the laws of agency. 
Carl Esbeck has described five parameters that can be vital to formulating 
an agency framework. These factors include: (1) the intended objects of the 
governmental regulation or action (i.e., the type of service being rendered 
by the faith-based organization); (2) the degree of connection between the 
faith-based organization and any central religious authority or institution; 
(3) the format of the governmental assistance (e.g., direct payments for an 
earmarked purpose, project grants, loans, in-kind donations of goods, free 
use of governmental property, free assistance by governmental staff or 
professionals, financial vouchers for beneficiaries, and tax credits or 
deductions); (4) whether the government gives the funding directly to the 
faith-based organization or whether individuals direct payments to the faith-
based organizations; and (5) how many levels of government are involved 
                                                                                                                           
 85. Id. 
 86. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606-07, 612-13 (1971). 
 87. See generally id. at 615-22.  
 88. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
 89. See generally id. at 604-10. 
 90. Id. at 609-10. 
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in monitoring or administering the faith-based organization’s program.91 
Esbeck concludes that, “The pronouncements of the Supreme Court declare 
that an entity is not a state actor simply because it is licensed or pervasively 
regulated by a state, nor is there ‘state action’ merely because the operating 
and capital costs of the private entity are heavily subsidized by 
governmental social programs.”92 
C. Examining Potential Agency Relationships Between Iowa and 
InnerChange 
The procedural history of Americans United illustrates that 
Establishment Clause cases are not always clear-cut. The district court, 
using the Lemon test, viewed the Iowa Department of Corrections’ (DOC) 
purpose in contracting with InnerChange as a purely secular purpose.93 The 
Eighth Circuit, however, viewed the DOC’s purpose as a sectarian one, not 
because the government acted intentionally to advance religion, but rather 
because the effects of the funding and contracts were to advance a 
particular religion.94 Yet, even in this instance the Court of Appeals 
employed a two-part analysis, one part of which examines whether the 
party depriving another of a constitutional right “may fairly be said to be a 
state actor.”95 
 1. Factual Background 
The InnerChange program was a nonprofit 501(c)(3) corporation 
affiliated with Prison Fellowship Ministries.96 From September 1999 to 
June 2007, InnerChange received partial funding through the State of Iowa 
for its residential inmate program at the Newton prison facility.97 The 
InnerChange program was “an intensive, voluntary, faith-based program of 
work and study within a loving community that promotes transformation . . 
. through the miraculous power of God’s love.”98 Inmates are not required 
to join or participate in InnerChange activities, and they are clearly told 
                                                                                                                           
 91. Carl H. Esbeck, Regulation of Religious Organizations via Governmental Financial 
Assistance, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 349, 354-56 (James A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006). 
 92. Id. at 385. 
 93. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 
509 F.3d 406, 423-24 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 94. Id. at 424. 
 95. Id. at 422 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). 
 96. Id. at 413. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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before they enroll that InnerChange is a faith-based alternative.99 
Furthermore, prisoners are told that enrollment in, and completion of, the 
InnerChange program will not affect their parole eligibility; they sign 
statements of understanding to this effect.100 In addition, inmates are 
informed that they may voluntarily withdraw from the program at any time 
and without any penalty.101 
Inmates who are interested in InnerChange become eligible for 
enrollment after completion of a brief introductory program, which 
illustrates civic values through stories in the Bible.102 Following the 
introductory program, inmates participate in a four-week orientation.103 
After completion of orientation, inmates must sign the InnerChange 
Accountability Covenant in order to continue to Phase I of the program.104 
This agreement states that inmates agree to apply the teachings and 
principles from Matthew 18:12-35 to their life (at least while participating 
in InnerChange), which relate to restoration, personal responsibility, 
mediation, conflict resolution, and forgiveness of others.105 
Phase I lasts twelve months. Inmates participate in required classes 
throughout the day, including times for devotional readings, group prayer, 
and singing.106 While some classes have religiously-based content, others 
concern topics such as substance abuse, anger management, financial 
management, and issues related to marriage, parenting, and family needs.107 
On Friday evenings, revival services are held, and there are church services 
on Sunday mornings. Inmates are required to attend these services.108 
In Phase II, which lasts six months, inmate participants sign a Continued 
Stay Agreement indicating their promise to continue to partake in the 
activities of Phase I.109 Phase II participants are also assigned mentors, who 
are InnerChange volunteers.110 In Phases I and II, inmate participants are 
evaluated quarterly based upon the civic virtues that they have incorporated 
into and applied to their lives.111 Inmates are able to enter Phase III of 
                                                                                                                           
 99. Id. at 414. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 415. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 414-15. 
 109. Id. at 415. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 416. 
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InnerChange’s program only if they are placed in a work release center by 
the DOC.112 Participation in Phase IV is available only to inmates who are 
released from confinement by the DOC.113 
In 1997, due to budgetary limitations, increased prison overcrowding 
concerns, and the lack of effective programs for inmates to participate in 
that reduce recidivism, Iowa examined a similar InnerChange program that 
had been highly effective in Texas.114 Although Iowa officials determined 
that the InnerChange program would work, the DOC issued a public request 
for proposals for pre-release, values-based programs at the Newton 
facility.115 InnerChange submitted the only proposal, and it was 
subsequently accepted by DOC.116  
In March 1999, the DOC and InnerChange signed a contract for 
InnerChange to provide program services from September 1999 until June 
2002.117 DOC agreed to reimburse InnerChange for non-religious costs and 
expenses.118 InnerChange received nearly $230,000 for the first year of its 
program.119 In the second year, it received almost $192,000, while its 
operating expenses exceeded $500,000. Meanwhile, in the third year of the 
program, InnerChange received the same amount as it had in the previous 
year, although its operating costs exceeded $575,000.120  
Near the end of this contract, Iowa again issued a public request for 
proposals; InnerChange was the only organization that decided to submit a 
proposal.121 Thus, the DOC and InnerChange signed a second contract that 
covered services from July 2002 until June 2005.122 Similar to the condition 
under the previous contract, the DOC paid InnerChange for its non-
religious operating expenses, giving InnerChange between $175,000 and 
$200,000 each year.123 However, InnerChange’s expenses continued to 
increase, exceeding $600,000, as the Newton program expanded.124 The 
warden of the Newton facility recognized that InnerChange gave the state 
exponentially more in return for its non-religious programs than what the 
                                                                                                                           
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 417. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 417-18. 
 124. Id. at 417. 
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state actually reimbursed InnerChange for (only about thirty to forty percent 
of its operating expenses).125 
This Note will now examine different aspects of the InnerChange 
program that support either a master-servant relationship or a non-agent 
independent contractor relationship between InnerChange and the DOC. 
 2. Evidence Leaning Towards a Master-Servant Agency Relationship 
The following facts seem to favor the establishment of a master-servant 
relationship, which would hold the State of Iowa liable for any 
unconstitutional acts committed by InnerChange or its personnel. Several of 
the factors used in determining whether a master-servant relationship exists 
reflect upon the servant’s use of the master’s resources. Here, the 
InnerChange program was located in the state’s Newton prison facility’s 
Unit E and Building M.126 Furthermore, InnerChange personnel were paid 
according to their respective positions rather than the amount of time that 
they spent conducting or organizing non-religious programs.127 In addition, 
DOC paid for gifts for InnerChange volunteers and graduating inmates, 
which were often religious in content, as well as a “church copyright 
license” for InnerChange’s use of religious worship music.128 
Another critical factor examines the level of control that the master has 
over the servant and its daily operations. There are some indications that the 
DOC exerted substantial control over InnerChange’s affairs. The DOC 
required InnerChange to provide regular disciplinary reports for inmates, 
while higher levels of discipline had to be conducted by DOC personnel.129 
It was on this basis that the court of appeals determined that InnerChange 
qualified as a “state actor” for the purposes of the § 1983 claim that 
plaintiffs brought against InnerChange.130 
A third factor of importance concerns the method of payment that the 
servant receives. Here, InnerChange was reimbursed on an annual basis.131 
But it is important to point out that in order for the aid money to be 
available for use by InnerChange, inmates had to be willing to participate in 
its faith-based program. Thus, there were not any alternative programs to 
which the inmates could direct the monies.132 However, the inmates did 
                                                                                                                           
 125. Id. at 418. 
 126. Id. at 414. 
 127. Id. at 418. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 423. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 416-18. 
 132. Id. at 425. 
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have the choice to remain in a traditional prison program or to be placed in 
the InnerChange program.133 
 3. Evidence Indicative of a Non-Agent Independent Contractor 
Relationship 
The Eighth Circuit noted that it did not matter if InnerChange’s views 
were pervasively sectarian.134 As such, it is important to think of 
InnerChange like any other recipient of state funding, regardless of its 
religious or secular characteristics. 
Control is perhaps the most important characteristic that distinguishes a 
master-servant relationship from an independent contractor relationship.135 
A non-agent independent contractor is generally free to make all of the 
small decisions as long as the project for which the employer has hired him 
is completed in a satisfactory manner.136 Thus, the independent contractor 
can determine how its work will be completed.  
Here, the DOC did not have any control over the selection of the 
InnerChange curriculum, nor did it partake in the teaching of the curriculum 
or the hiring of teachers for the program.137 The only thing that the DOC’s 
proposal request required was submission of proposals for values-based 
programs, which could also have been secular in nature. In addition, the 
inmates were supervised by InnerChange staff without assistance from 
DOC personnel.138 InnerChange effectively had complete power 24 hours 
per day to “incarcerate, treat, and discipline inmates.”139 Although there 
was some administrative cooperation between the DOC and InnerChange, 
the DOC did not pervasively monitor InnerChange’s affairs.140 This 
independence of the InnerChange program is also evident in how the 
inmate participants were affected by the program’s administration. The 
InnerChange participants were not treated like typical inmates in the state 
penitentiaries. They were granted greater privacy and access to computers, 
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and they were afforded more opportunities to receive visits from family 
members.141 
All of these facts strongly favor labeling the InnerChange program as a 
non-agent independent contractor of the State of Iowa. Although 
InnerChange was performing a vital state function, it had free reign to run 
its residential rehabilitation program as it saw fit. 
V.  PROPOSED AGENCY FRAMEWORK 
Although the Lemon test is the most prominent test used in resolving 
Establishment Clause issues, several others have been employed, including 
Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement test.” However, none of these tests have 
been consistently applied by the Court, and individual justices frequently 
apply tests inconsistently themselves. 
An agency framework would serve as a better test for constantly 
determining the legitimate scope of permissible acts under the 
Establishment Clause. First, an agency framework could practically restore 
the Establishment Clause to its original meaning and allow constitutional 
questions to be resolved based upon the text and meaning of the 
Constitution rather than the subjective pronouncements of jurists. Whereas 
the Lemon test and the endorsement test have failed to provide judges with 
sufficient flexibility to apply them consistently to all Establishment Clause 
issues, a test based upon objective agency principles could be employed 
consistently across the board without reaching divergent results. Most 
Establishment Clause cases hinge upon an analysis of whether a certain 
action had the effect of establishing religion. A proper analysis of that 
effect, and of its constitutional implications, needs to consider whether the 
action that caused the effect was sanctioned by the government. An agency 
framework provides the best alternative for considering this question 
because it does not result in overly broad prohibitions against religious 
effects that are caused by private, non-governmental entities; it 
acknowledges that private organizations can work to establish their 
religious beliefs in society, while civil government is prevented from 
establishing such a religion.142 Impliedly, it recognizes that the jurisdictions 
of government and religion are distinct; where the government fails, 
religious institutions may be able to operate effectively.  
In this sense, an agency approach may best integrate the Establishment 
and Free Exercise Clauses, as it denies government the authority to directly 
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impose religious beliefs on the citizenry, while at the same time providing 
the most opportunities for citizens to participate in surrounding religious 
activities.143 Simply put, what the government may not be able to do itself, 
private organizations may be able to do; however, government may not 
force private organizations to do things that it could not do on its own. This 
is particularly true in the prison context, where prisoners are unable to 
engage in many religious practices unless opportunities and resources are 
made available to them.144  
Second, an agency framework would bring reasonableness to the church-
state debate. It would emphasize our nation’s commitment to religious 
liberty and diversity, while simultaneously recognizing that religion has a 
vital role to play in the public square, including participation in community 
development and a voice in governmental discussions related to political, 
social, and moral concerns.145 Separatists routinely claim that all religious 
activities and ideas need to be quarantined from the public arena. However, 
such a view neglects to realize that all activities—whether religious or 
secular—are based upon particular beliefs that aim to answer the ultimate 
questions of life when taken to their logical conclusions. As a result, every 
form of political and religious speech inevitably creates a class of outsiders 
who are excluded by the supporters of a particular viewpoint. Secular 
organizations inherently treat religious adherents as outsiders, at least to the 
same degree that non-religious citizens feel alienated by the work of faith-
based organizations. This is especially true considering that the vast amount 
of evidence indicates that most faith-based organizations de-emphasize 
their particular religious beliefs when providing services to those in need; 
they do not engage in overt religious advocacy, proselytization, or 
discrimination based upon religious criteria.146  
An agency framework would bring a breath of fresh air to the many 
contemporary debates over the proper role and policies of governments, 
because “[t]o suggest that such assertions [that provide religious solutions 
to social problems] are by virtue of their religious nature inappropriate is to 
foist on political discourse an artificial straightjacket that has no place in 
American history or law.”147 At the same time, an agency-based test would 
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caution anyone who might advocate for a more theocratic approach to civil 
society by reaffirming our nation’s long-time prohibition against the use of 
religious tests to determine who can and cannot legitimately serve society.   
Third, the implementation of an agency framework would eliminate 
discrimination that results from First Amendment tests that are based 
merely upon the simplistic distinctions between things that are “religious” 
and “non-religious” or organizations that are “faith-based” and “non-faith-
based.”148 It would foster a healthier relationship between governments and 
societal institutions, such as faith-based organizations, by “nourish[ing] and 
sustain[ing] the integrity and identity of a wide array of nongovernment 
institutions and [ending] discrimination against institutions that currently 
are discriminated against.”149 In this respect, an agency framework would 
also minimize the “chilling effect [that other Establishment Clause tests 
might have] on the willingness of faith-based organizations to contribute to 
the solution of social problems.”150 
The proposed agency framework consists of three primary steps. The 
first step is determining the governmental interest(s) involved and the 
appropriate level of scrutiny required by the courts. In Americans United, 
the governmental interests involved were the preservation of effective 
prison management and the reduction of recidivism in criminal activity. 
Since a fundamental right is involved in this case, i.e., thwarting the 
religious exercise of inmates, the proper standard of review could arguably 
be strict scrutiny.151 
The second step in the agency framework is determining whether the 
asserted governmental interest is legitimate or whether it is only a pretext 
for funding faith-based organizations. At this step, a look at the accounting 
of the faith-based organization may serve as a superior indicator of whether 
it is using funds properly or whether it is receiving funds only as a “payoff” 
or “special favor” from some legislator. In Americans United, there was no 
indication that there was any fraudulent activity related to the funding by 
either InnerChange and Prison Fellowship Ministries or the State of Iowa 
and its Department of Corrections. This is especially evident from the fact 
that InnerChange’s operating expenses were almost double what it received 
from the DOC in grants. 
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The third step is determining whether the faith-based organization is 
acting as an agent (servant) of the state (principal) or whether it is merely 
acting as a non-agent independent contractor. There are three subparts to 
this prong of the test. First, the principal must be identified. In Americans 
United, the plaintiffs implied that the State of Iowa was the principal. 
Second, the presumed agent must be identified. Here, the plaintiffs alleged 
that Prison Fellowship Ministries, through its InnerChange program, was 
acting as an agent of the State of Iowa. The final subpart is to analyze the 
agency relationship between the identified principal and presumed agent, 
and to analyze how the funding is being utilized. As previously described in 
Part IV.C above, due to the lack of control that Iowa had over the daily 
affairs and operations of the InnerChange program, and the fact that the 
governmental funding was used only for operational expenses, rather than 
for sectarian purposes, the agency relationship can best be categorized as an 
independent contractor relationship. Since the resulting relationship is one 
of an independent contractor, there cannot be an Establishment Clause 
violation. However, if there had been a master-servant relationship, then 
there might have been an Establishment Clause violation, if the actions did 
not pass constitutional muster under the proper standard of review. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
In Americans United for the Separation of Church and State v. Prison 
Fellowship Ministries, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
determined that there was an Establishment Clause violation when the State 
of Iowa provided funding to InnerChange’s value-based, rehabilitative 
inmate program. However, the court’s basis for finding that Prison 
Fellowship Ministries, and hence InnerChange, was a state actor was not 
founded upon stable constitutional principles. Even the Lemon test would 
not reach such a definition for state action. Yet, when the principles of 
agency are applied to Americans United and other Establishment Clause 
cases, courts can properly determine whether there is an agency relationship 
that potentially violates the Establishment Clause, or whether the religious 
nature of the faith-based organization is irrelevant. Under the proposed 
agency framework, this Note contends that the Eighth Circuit’s holding that 
the InnerChange program was unconstitutional is erroneous. The court 
should not have found any Establishment Clause violation, because 
InnerChange was simply a non-agent independent contractor of the Iowa 
Department of Corrections. 
